“MR. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: WHOM
WOULD YOU NOMINATE?”
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Mitu Gulati*
Presidential candidates compete on multiple fronts for votes. Who is
more likeable? Who will negotiate more effectively with allies and
adversaries? Who has the better vice-presidential running mate? Who
will make better appointments to the Supreme Court and the cabinet?
This last question is often discussed long before the inauguration, for
the impact of a secretary of state or a Supreme Court justice can be
tremendous. Despite the importance of such appointments, we do not
expect candidates to compete on naming the better slates of nominees.
For the candidates themselves, avoiding competition over nominees in
the pre-election context has personal benefits—in particular, enabling
them to keep a variety of supporters working hard on the campaign in
the hope of being chosen as nominees. But from a social perspective,
this norm has costs. This Article proposes that candidates be induced
out of the status quo. In the current era of candidates responding to
internet queries and members of the public asking questions via
YouTube, it is plausible that the question—“Whom would you nominate
(as secretary of state or for the Supreme Court)?”—might be asked in a
public setting. If one candidate is behind in the race, he can be pushed
to answer the question—and perhaps increase his chances of winning
the election.
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Let him say not one single word about his principles, or his creed—let
him say nothing—promise nothing. Let no Committee, no convention—
no town meeting ever extract from him a single word, about what he
thinks now, or what he will do hereafter. Let the use of pen and ink be
wholly forbidden as if he were a mad poet in Bedlam.
—Advice that Nicholas Biddle, the manager of William Henry
Harrison’s successful 1840 campaign for the presidency, reportedly
gave the presidential candidate.1

I. INTRODUCTION: NAMING NAMES
Imagine that it is fall 2012. Mitt Romney, the Republican
challenger for the presidency, has been four to eight points behind
President Barack Obama in every poll for the last five months,
except for a small post-convention bounce for Romney that soon
dissipated. If Romney does not do something to change the dynamic
of the presidential race, he will lose. One of his advisers suggests
that Romney announce who his top cabinet members will be and/or
whom he plans to nominate to the Supreme Court. If he proposes
one or more nominees who appeal to a key constituency, then he
might attract enough of those voters to help him in the general
election.
This move involves risks.
Some voters will be
disappointed because their favored cabinet and Court candidates
were not selected. But Romney is behind in the polls and is looking
for a strategy that might turn things around. If the odds are that he is
going to lose anyway, why not name names?
Presidential candidates inevitably claim that they will nominate
better people than their competition will. But they are rarely pushed
to name names prior to the election. When the matter of naming
names comes up, candidates sidestep. For example, during the 2008
election, Obama said, “I don’t want to tip my hand” by naming
possible nominees for the Supreme Court.2 Instead, he explained that
he wanted justices who would “follow . . . clear legal precedent,”
“stop giving the executive branch carte blanche” to do whatever it
wants, and, where the law was unclear, consider the interests of
1. Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition,
66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555, 555 (1972) (quoting NICHOLAS BIDDLE, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
NICHOLAS BIDDLE 256 (R.C. McGrane ed., Houghton Mifflin 1919)).
2. See Videotape: Obama’s “Philosophy about the Supreme Court,” available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PACfWBUY3mA (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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“those who are vulnerable in our political system.”3 On a separate
occasion, he announced that he wanted justices who would have
“empathy.”4 In sum, he provided little more than vague generalities
as to who his justices were likely to be, even though the implicit
suggestion in his “I don’t want to tip my hand” statement was that he
and his advisers had already thought about potential Supreme Court
nominees. There may have been personal benefits to Obama from
not “tipping his hand.” Most notably, he could keep a variety of his
supporters working hard on his campaign in the hope of being chosen
as nominees. But the benefits to society of candidates being forced
to show their cards prior to the election may be greater still.
It is trite to say that the current system of presidential
nominations is flawed. The question is how to make it better. For
those of us who have no direct power to effectuate change, the
solution has to be one that can be achieved without the need for
resources, votes, lobbyists, and the like. The idea will strike many as
nutty. But asking candidates to name names may yield real answers,
and the process of asking and answering may produce change.5
Our hope is to induce competition between the presidential
candidates over who would choose the better nominees. There are
barriers to inducing this competition.
But they might be
surmountable when one candidate is significantly behind in the polls
and is willing to take some risks. The key is to consider how pre-

3. Id.
4. Carrie Dann, Obama on Judges, Supreme Court, MSNBC, July 17, 2007,
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/17/274143.aspx. Perhaps the most specific
Obama got was during one of the debates when, in response to a question about the kinds of
people he would appoint to the Court, he said that he would seek “people who have life
experience and they understand what it means to be on the outside, what it means to have the
system not work for them . . . .” Transcript: The Democratic Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/politics/15debate-transcript.html
?partner=permalink&exprod=permalink (citing the Federal News Service).
5. A few people have made similar suggestions in recent years via blog posts and an op-ed,
but there has been no extended discussion of the idea. See Chris Sprigman, Op-Ed., Ministers
Without Portfolio (Yet), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23 (suggesting that John Kerry name a
shadow cabinet); James Boyce, Barack and His Shadow: Should He Appoint a Shadow Cabinet
Now?, HUFFINGTON POST, May 29, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyce/barackand-his-shadow-sho_b_104035.html; Matthew Yglesias, Shadow Cabinet, THEATLANTIC.COM,
July 16, 2004, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2004/07/shadow_cabinet.php.
Part of the reason for the lack of discussion about potential cabinet members may be the belief
that such an announcement would be illegal. As we discuss below, there is indeed a federal
statute that could be read to prohibit such an announcement, but such an application would clearly
violate the First Amendment. See infra Part V.A.
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election choices might differ from what we would expect from that
same president once elected. For instance, we might move from the
current state in which Supreme Court nominees are usually young
federal appeals court judges with uncontroversial publication
records, to a model of older and more interesting non-judges.
II. THE STATUS QUO AND ITS DRAWBACKS
A. The Status Quo
Presidential candidates choose and announce their choice for
vice president in advance, and usually perceive the choice as one that
can help them in the election. But the tradition is not to name
anyone else. In contrast, Britain has a tradition of “shadow
governments,” in which the party out of power has an entire cabinet
of alternative (or “shadow”) ministers who are generally expected to
take on those same roles if their party comes to power.6 Voters thus
have a sense not only of the Prime Minister they are potentially
electing but also of the ministers who will serve in the cabinet.
Candidates sometimes say that they would select justices “like”
certain sitting justices. George W. Bush promised to select justices
like Antonin Scalia.7 Similarly, John McCain said that John Roberts
and Samuel Alito “would serve as the model for my own nominees.”8
Meanwhile, candidates sometimes give hints about whom they
would consider for cabinet positions. For example, it was widely
believed that Thomas Dewey was going to choose John Foster Dulles
as his secretary of state in 1948.9 But presidential candidates have
not publicly promised that they will choose X, Y, or Z.10
6. E.g., RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
GOVERNMENT 171–81 (1999).
7. See Fred Barnes, Bush Scalia, WEEKLY STANDARD, July 5, 1999, at 16.
8. Dana Bash, Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals Ready for
Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/
scotus.bush/index.html; Libby Quaid, McCain Castigates Obama on Judges, LAW.COM, May 6,
2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421162864.
9. See John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Arlington National Cemetery,
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jfdulles.htm (“It was generally believed that Mr. Dulles would
have been Secretary of State if Mr. Dewey had won, but Harry S. Truman was the surprise
victor.”).
10. Candidate George W. Bush, for example, intimated that he would name Colin Powell as
his Secretary of State. See Jamie McIntyre, Secretary Powell? Bush Hints at Former General’s
Role, CNN.COM, Aug. 1, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/08/01/
powell.state/index.html.
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B. Problems with the Status Quo
Only after they are elected do presidents identify their cabinet
choices and (with luck) eventually a few Supreme Court nominees.
The president’s incentives at this stage are not to win votes—he
already did that.11 Now, the incentives are a combination of wanting
to perpetuate his legacy well beyond his time, to pay back political
favors from the election, and to protect against the Senate
undermining his nominee.
A president’s choices often give rise to complaints involving
surprise and the qualifications of nominees.12 As to the former,
critics might say that the president is not nominating the sort of
people whom he indicated he would nominate when he was a
candidate. As to the latter, the complaints involving cabinet
members might focus on the perceived inexperience of some
nominees. Relatedly, there is often suspicion that these nominations
are a form of patronage.13 The complaints involving Supreme Court
justices often involve their ideology as well as their youth, since
presidents have an incentive to nominate relative youngsters to the
bench in the hope that they will have long careers and thus extend
presidential legacies.
1. Supreme Court Nominees
Before the election, presidential candidates are primarily
concerned about winning. Pre-election, the matter of creating a
legacy is a back-burner issue, if one at all. After the election, legacy
creation moves to the front burner. Presidents have an interest in
nominating justices who are as young as possible. This interest
flows from a particular exception: the United States is one of the
only nations that has neither a retirement age nor a term limit for the
members of its highest court.14
11. A newly elected President likely hopes to be reelected, but he would also know that reelection was sufficiently far away that his initial choice of cabinet and Supreme Court nominees
would have a fairly attenuated effect on the election four years hence.
12. See Richard W. Stevenson, When a President Is Not Spoiling for a Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4 2005, at A24.
13. See Posting of Dr. Denny, Bush’s Patronage Appointments to Ambassador Exceeds
Father’s, Clinton’s, to ScholarsandRogues.wordpress.com, (June 25, 2007), http://www.scholars
androgues.com/2007/06/25/bushs-patronage-appointments-to-ambassador-exceed-fathers-clinto
ns/#more-917.
14. For an international comparison, see Reed Watson & Matthew W. Wolfe, Comparing
Judicial Compensation: Apples, Oranges and Cherry-Picking (Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished
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So a president seeking to maximize the impact of his
appointments (and why shouldn’t he?) has an interest in appointing
justices who have many years to live. Unsurprisingly, in light of this
incentive, most recent Supreme Court nominees have been fifty-five
or younger, and Clarence Thomas was forty-three.15 On the flip side,
judges in their sixties, like J. Harvie Wilkinson or Richard Posner,
are considered too old to be appointed to the Court—and not because
of any diminishment in their judging intellect. Most experts would
likely say that a person with a longer career and the varied
experiences that go along with it would be a preferable choice for a
justice, because such a person would exercise better judgment.16 In
addition, commentators have expressed concern about the
entrenchment that young appointments can entail, delaying for years
the impact of changes in the popular will.17
A different complaint is more specific to recent Supreme Court
nomination trends: the absence of political experience among its
members.18 This is probably the starkest discontinuity between the
current Supreme Court and its predecessors. For the first time in
history, no justice of the Supreme Court has ever served in any
legislature or ever held (or even run for) any elective public office.19
abstract, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106244). Even within
the United States, few of the individual states allow for life appointments. See Stephen J. Choi,
G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for
an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary (U. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program Working
Paper No. 357, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008989.
15. See Findlaw Supreme Court Center: Supreme Court: Present Justices, http://
supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/presjustices.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009)
(eight of the nine Justices on the current Supreme Court were fifty-five or younger when
nominated; Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the exception).
16. See generally Gregory A. Caldeira, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness
on the Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAVIOR 247, 247 (1988).
17. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON & ROGER C. CRAMTON, REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2005). It is remarkable that, decades after every other
Gerald Ford appointee has left office, John Stevens remains in office—or that the person Stevens
replaced (William O. Douglas) stepped down in the Ford administration after having been
nominated in the middle of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. See SUPREME COURT OF
THE U.S., MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
18. See Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L.
652, 663, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1098743.
19. See Timothy P. O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experiential Diversity
on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 702 (2007) (noting these facts, along with the fact
that “[f]or the first time in history every justice had been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals at
the time of appointment to the Supreme Court.”); Dorsen, supra note 18, at 663. David Souter
was Attorney General of New Hampshire for two years, but he was appointed to that position
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The Court has but two members who served as high-level members
of the executive branch, and neither was in the cabinet or was
otherwise a significant political figure.20 Scholars have noted the
break with historical practice.21 Through most of its history, the
Court had several members who were important political figures
before they joined the Court—senators (e.g., Hugo Black), governors
(e.g., Earl Warren), presidents or presidential candidates (e.g.,
William Howard Taft), members of the president’s cabinet (e.g.,
Robert H. Jackson), or all of the above (e.g., Salmon Chase, who was
a senator, governor, presidential candidate, and cabinet member
before he became chief justice).22
Many note this development with chagrin. They argue that the
country would be better served if some Supreme Court justices had
significant political experience.23 The cases before the Supreme
Court often involve issues where knowledge of the political process
would be helpful, e.g., cases where the exigencies of legislative or
executive decision-making loom large. Also, some have argued that
serving on the Supreme Court involves more than adjudicating—that
it is in part a policy-making position and that the experiences

(and left it to become a judge).
See LII: US Supreme Court: Justice Souter,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/souter.bio.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
20. We are defining “high level” as those who are confirmed by the Senate, which includes
all executive officers under the Appointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The two are
Antonin Scalia (Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel) and Clarence Thomas
(head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). Neither held a cabinet-level position,
but both were Senate-confirmed. See generally Oyez: Justices, http://www.oyez.org/justices/
(last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
21. See Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some
Republican Supreme Court Justices ‘Evolve’ and Others Don’t? (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 06-127), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=935129.
22. Stephen Maizlish, Salmon P. Chase: The Roots of Ambition and the Origins of Reform,
18 J. EARLY REP. 1, 47–50 (1998); see Adam Liptak, Obama Has Chance to Select Justice With
Varied Résumé, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A1 (“In 1946, for instance, eight of the nine justices
had not been sitting judges when they were appointed. . . . The justices who sat in 1946 . . .
included two former attorneys general, two senators, a Treasury secretary, a chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and a law professor.”); see generally O’Neill, supra note
19, at 727-31 (discussing backgrounds of the justices).
23. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial
Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 903 (2003).
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entailed in running for elective office (or at least serving as major
appointed political officials) give justices a valuable perspective.24
Our point is not to endorse this critique but to note that it, like
many academic critiques, identifies a problem on which the public
currently has no impact. The president nominates and the Senate
confirms.25 It is possible for a group of citizens to lobby the
president to choose a particular Supreme Court nominee or lobby the
Senate not to confirm a nominee who lacks significant political
experience. But it is hard to imagine any of the special interest
groups that are capable of the necessary lobbying doing anything
about this concern. Their interests probably go in the reverse
direction. The trend toward nominating Supreme Court justices with
little political experience has occurred alongside a rise in the
lobbying of presidents and senators.26
2. Cabinet Nominations
There is less commonality in the criticisms of the cabinetnomination process, but the two most common involve partisanship
and qualifications. George W. Bush’s first cabinet provides an
example. His campaign for the presidency emphasized that he was a
moderate governor who often reached across the aisle and worked
closely with Democrats.27 When he was elected president in the
closest presidential election in American history, many expected that
he would fill his cabinet with moderate cabinet members and a fair
number of Democrats. Instead, there was only one Democrat—the
moderate to conservative Norman Mineta (and Mineta’s position,
secretary of transportation, has traditionally been considered one of
the least important cabinet positions). Meanwhile, Bush appointed
two politicians associated with the right wing of his party (John
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 259–64 (4th ed. 2005); O’Neill, supra note 19, at 722–34; see also
Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
26. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street: Lobbying Firms Hire More,
Pay More, Charge More to Influence Government, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at A01 (reporting
that between 2000 and 2005, the number of registered lobbyists doubled from 16,342 to 34,785);
Opensecrets.org, Lobbying Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (last visited
Mar. 18, 2009) (from 2000 to 2007 total lobbying spending increased from $1.54 billion to $2.81
billion).
27. Alison Mitchell, The 2000 Campaign: The Texas Governor; Bush’s Bipartisanship
Would Face Tough Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at A10.
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Ashcroft and Donald Rumsfeld) to two of the most important cabinet
positions (Attorney General and Secretary of Defense).28
A parallel in the context of the 2008 election is that Barack
Obama was rumored to be considering two Republicans, Chuck
Hagel and Richard Lugar, for senior cabinet positions, in an attempt
to win over voters from John McCain.29 Obama did not, however,
announce that Hagel and Lugar were his top choices (although he
was willing to say that they were possibilities, while at the same time
widening the pool of possibilities to include even Arnold
Schwarzenegger).30 In response to questions from The Sunday Times
regarding his choice of cabinet, he was coy in saying “Chuck Hagel
is a great friend of mine and I respect him very much.”31 Maybe we
should not allow the candidates to escape with coyness and ask them
for clarification. Allowing them to escape with such answers gives
them greater discretion, after the election, to forget their implicit preelection commitments to marginal voters and instead use the
appointments to satisfy their core support groups.
The example of George W. Bush’s cabinet appointments is
interesting in that it stands in contrast to the example of Court
appointments. In the Court context, the absence of a pre-election
competition over naming names seems to result in relatively young
and middle-of-the-road appointments. With the Bush Cabinet
appointments discussed above, we did not see the same dynamic.
Rumsfeld and Ashcroft were anything but middle-of-the-road or
uncontroversial. Nor were they particularly youthful. The different
dynamic is due in part to the fact that cabinet members are not
appointed for life, unlike Supreme Court members. Because cabinet
members serve no longer than the president and are understood to be
political, senators have historically been more willing to confirm
partisan cabinet members.32 It is hard to imagine any Supreme Court
28. The “big four” departments are traditionally regarded as the Departments of Justice,
Defense, Treasury, and State. See David Greenberg, The Sorry Lot of a Bush Cabinet Secretary,
SLATE, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2110032/.
29. See Sarah Baxter, Barnstorming Obama Plans to Pick Republicans for Cabinet, SUNDAY
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_
americas/us_elections/article3466823.ece.
30. See Posting of Sunlen Miller to blogs.abcnews.com, http://blogs.abcnews.com/
politicalradar/2007/12/obama-says-hed.html (Dec. 20, 2007, 08:29 EST).
31. Baxter, supra note 29.
32. United States Senate, Nominations, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com
mon/briefing/Nominations.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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nominee openly averring that she was a partisan Democrat or
Republican, whereas such partisanship is common for cabinet
appointees.33
The result is that the political dynamics surrounding Supreme
Court and cabinet appointments diverge. But for both kinds of
appointments, the pre- and post-election nomination considerations
might be quite different. In each case, we should expect that preelection choices would be different from Supreme Court and cabinet
members chosen post-election. Had there been an explicit preelection competition in naming names—in which Bush and Gore
named their top choices in the pre-election context—polarizing
figures like Rumsfeld and Ashcroft might not have gotten the nod.
Their appointments, after the election, were perhaps paybacks to
Bush’s core constituency.
Had there been a pre-election
competition, the focus might have been on capturing the votes of
those in the middle to whom Rumsfeld and Ashcroft would not have
appealed.
III. WHY ANSWER?
The convention against announcing selections may seem natural,
given that it has existed for many years. But it might not be that
difficult to change. If we simply asked presidential nominees to tell
us whom they would nominate for the Supreme Court and their
cabinet before we voted for them, they might answer. The paradigm
for our thinking about this Article was the CNN/YouTube video
questions asked of the candidates during the 2008 primary
campaign.34 That process enabled individual citizens to ask the
candidates direct questions, as they do in “town hall” meetings with
candidates.
Why would a candidate answer such a question? The naysayers
will explain that answering—naming specific names—would so
constrain the presidential candidate and be so risky that no candidate
would do it. Those answers are too simple.
The observation that candidates for political office prefer to
make vague pronouncements rather than specific ones is not new.

33. Id.
34. CNN/YouTube Democratic Debate: Complete Video, http://www.cnn.com/2007/
POLITICS/07/24/youtube.debate.video/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
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Scholars have posited explanations for the preference for
obfuscation, grounded in the proposition that candidates have more
to lose than to gain by being specific.35 Our goal is not to take issue
with those positive analyses of political behavior. Rather, it is to ask
whether there are circumstances under which the presidential
candidates might be willing (with inducement, if necessary) to be
more specific. After all, candidates sometimes are willing to take
risks in an attempt to change the dynamics of a race they seem to be
losing.36
The circumstance we have in mind is where one candidate is
significantly behind in the polls and can identify an important voting
group with many members who are leaning toward his opponent (or
toward staying home on election day) but are potentially movable.
The voting group, let us say, is not convinced that the candidate who
is behind really shares their values. The candidate can say that he
shares their values, but talk is cheap. Vague promises are not going
to help persuade voters who are on the fence or leaning away; they
are already skeptical.37 The candidate can promise to enact policies
they favor. But the candidate can also tell them that he will nominate
a person whom they know to favor their positions, and that could be
valuable to those voters. It will be particularly valuable insofar as it
is harder to wriggle out of those promises. A candidate who
promises to appoint justices like Scalia and Thomas might be able to
claim that Harriet Miers fits the bill. A candidate who promises to
appoint either John Roberts, Sam Alito, or Mike Luttig cannot make
the same claim about Miers.
A related response is that not enough voters will care who the
appointees are, and thus presidential candidates will not see any
benefit in naming names. It is true, for example, that vice35. See Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, The Politics of Ambiguity, 105 Q. J. ECON. 829
(1990); Benjamin I. Page, The Theory of Political Ambiguity, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 742 (1976);
Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 555 (1972). Although much of the scholarship on the politics of ambiguity is in
political science, legal scholars have also discussed the question in the context of Congress
passing ambiguous legislation. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default
Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (2004).
36. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, A Scrappy Fighter, McCain Honed His Debating Style In
and Out of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A25.
37. Cf. Harris Delles & Vally Koubi, Smoke Screen: A Theoretical Framework, 78 PUB.
CHOICE 351 (1994) (smokescreens work better as a strategy for political candidates when they
already have a high reputation and the voters in question are not particularly discerning).
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presidential choices generally do not change a significant percentage
of voters in the national electorate.38 But vice presidents can help the
ticket in one or more important states (e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson’s
presence on the ticket was crucial for John F. Kennedy carrying
Texas, in what turned out to be a very close election).39 And though
Sarah Palin was not able to swing the 2008 election in John
McCain’s favor, she helped energize the conservative base in a way
that McCain had not been able to do on his own.40 Only a small
percentage of voters will change their votes based on who the
secretary of the treasury or chief justice will be, just as a small
number will change their votes based on a candidate’s position on
NAFTA41 or the estate tax.42 But those small numbers can be gamechangers in an election.
Most sports fans are knowledgeable about more than one player
on a given team. For better or worse, we do not expect most voters
to be as knowledgeable about the president’s team as they are about
their favorite sports teams, but the relevant threshold is not a
majority of voters. The question is whether an electorally significant
38. Polling data show that, among recent vice presidents, Dan Quayle is the only one whose
presence on the ticket appears to have changed the votes of more than 1 percent of voters—in his
case away from the ticket. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L.
REV. 913, 926 (1992). The impact of Sarah Palin on the outcome of the 2008 election is less
clear, see infra note 40, but CNN’s exit poll found that a remarkable 7 percent of voters said that
McCain’s choice of Palin was the most important factor in their vote. See Local Exit Polls –
Election Center 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p6 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Local Exit Polls].
39. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 872 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, For the Republican Base, Palin Pick Is Energizing, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. Some polling data and some Republican politicians suggested that
Palin’s presence on the ticket hurt McCain. See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman,
Growing Doubts on Palin Take Toll, Poll Finds, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1; Juliet Eilperin,
Palin Plans to Remain on GOP’s National Stage, WASH POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A14 (“The
reservations some voters have about Palin intensified over time in the Washington Post-ABC
News poll. In the survey released Monday night, 44 percent of likely voters said McCain’s
choice of Palin as his running mate had made them less apt to vote for the GOP ticket.”); Adam
Nagourney, Second-Guessing the Vice-Presidential Pick, NY TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, available at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/politics/27web-nagourney.html. Meanwhile, CNN’s exit
poll found that of the 60 percent of voters who said that McCain’s choice of Palin was a factor in
their vote, 56 percent voted for McCain versus 43 percent for Obama. By comparison, of the 33
percent who said Palin was not a factor, 33 percent voted for McCain versus 65 percent for
Obama. Local Exit Polls, supra note 38.
41. Posting of Todd Tucker to Eyes on Trade, http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/
2008/09/coolness-to-naf.html (Sept. 17, 2008).
42. Press Release, Women Impacting Public Policy, National Survey Shows People Want
US Senate to Repeal Death Tax (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.policyandtaxationgroup.com/pdf/NationalSurveyRepealDTax.pdf.
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number of movable voters would pay attention to the president’s
nominees, and we believe that the answer is yes.
There is evidence that, for example, Americans care about the
Supreme Court to a significant degree (and more than citizens of
most other nations care about their highest court).43 A poll released
in May 2008 found that 30 percent of Republicans picked Supreme
Court appointments as their top voting issue in the upcoming
presidential election—more than picked the war in Iraq.44 That 30
percent of the electorate says something is their top issue does not
mean that a given name will actually sway anything close to 30
percent of voters. It is unlikely that a given name will move 5
percent or even 1 percent of the national electorate. But if selecting a
particular person could move even half of one percent of the voters
in a swing state, that would be a huge impact for a presidential
candidate.45
The presidential election is winner-take-all. If one of the
candidates is behind in the polls, he should be willing to take risks to
get ahead. If he thinks he can potentially sway a segment of voters
who would not otherwise vote for him, he might take the risk that he
will offend others. Say that Obama is having difficulty getting the
43. See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 343 (1998).
44. See Scott Rasmussen, For Republicans, Judicial Appointments Matter More Than Iraq,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS, May 21, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/
election_20082/2008_presidential_election/for_republicans_judicial_appointments_matter_more
_than_iraq.
When it comes to how they will vote in November, Republican voters say that the type
of Supreme Court Justices a candidate would appoint is more important than the War
in Iraq. The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey found that 44 percent
of Republicans pick the economy as the top voting issue, 30 percent name judicial
appointments, and just 19 percent pick the War in Iraq.
Id.
45. In this regard, it is notable that campaigns often see an electoral advantage in attacking
either close advisers who are presumed to be likely nominees or existing appointees in election
campaigns. Henry Kissinger managed to be the focus of negative campaigning both by Ronald
Reagan (in the Republican primaries and convention) and by Jimmy Carter (in the general
election) in 1976. See Walter Isaacson et al., Rolling Out the Big Guns, TIME, Aug. 1, 1983,
available at http://205.188.238.109/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921297,00.html (Reagan
criticizing Ford by saying that “Kissinger’s stewardship of U.S. foreign policy has coincided
precisely with the loss of U.S. military supremacy.”); Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library &
Museum, Presidential Campaign Debate of October 6, 1976, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/
speeches/760854.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) (“Mr. Ford, Mr. Kissinger have continued on
with the policies and failures of Richard Nixon” and “as far as foreign policy goes, Mr. Kissinger
has been the President of this country.”).
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share of the women’s vote that Democratic candidates usually get
and that he believes he needs to raise that percentage in order to win.
One way to get that share might be to pick a female vice president.46
But let us say that most female voters are skeptical and do not think
that a vice president has enough power to make a difference. Or it
could be that Obama does not want a female vice president. The
female voters still need to be persuaded. And their skepticism means
that they will need a credible signal rather than vague promises.47 To
solve this problem, Obama could announce that his top three picks
for the Court are all women who share the values of Hillary Clinton
supporters—or he could announce that Hillary herself will be his
next pick for the Court. If the makeup of the Court and the issues it
addresses, such as abortion, are voting issues for a number of
women, then such an announcement might bring a nontrivial number
of these voters into the Obama camp.
The point is that if candidates see that naming names is a way to
win votes, they can be pushed to answer the question. And a
candidate who is behind in the polls will be more likely to offer
names. The risk is not that different from many of the risks
candidates already take. For example, a candidate who runs
personally hostile advertisements might win over some voters but
alienate others. By moving the discussion of specific nominees to
the pre-election context, we convert it into one of the weapons that
the candidates are allowed (or forced, insofar as they are grilled by a
questioner) to use in their competition.
When presidential candidates give names in advance, they
constrain themselves. The fewer names they give per position,48 the
greater the constraint. That said, the president will ultimately choose

46. Some Hillary Clinton supporters said they would vote for McCain rather than Obama in
response to the sexism that they perceived in the Democrats’ process. See Ina Jaffe, Citing
Sexism, Clinton Supporters Vow Switch, NPR, May 23, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=90755773. A similar story can be told for McCain, who needed to persuade
some conservative voters that he really was conservative. One of the concerns had to do with
whether he really would appoint conservative enough justices to the court. Robert D. Novak, Is
McCain a Conservative? WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2008, at A21 (reporting on accounts that McCain
might have thought Alito too conservative and how these reports have concerned many
conservatives).
47. See Eric Posner & Adrienne Vermuele, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865
(2007) (discussing credible signals from the executive).
48. We imagine they will proffer a single name per cabinet position, to give themselves the
maximum benefit from naming particular people.
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just one person per position, so this is simply moving the constraint
forward in time. But beyond the differences discussed above about
who will be chosen, naming names in advance does rule out one preelection possibility: promising, or at least suggesting, the same job to
more than one person. Pre-election, a presidential candidate can hint
to multiple people that they will be his choice for secretary of the
treasury.49 Post-election, there can be only one choice. The
presidential candidate will thus forego the option of (falsely)
promising the same job to several people. But if the choice is
between foregoing such a constraint and not being president versus
accepting this constraint but being president, we would expect
candidates to choose the latter option.
How do we game this out? If the slates that each presidential
candidate picked cancelled each other out (in terms of the votes
netted by each slate), naming names would be a version of the
prisoner’s dilemma.50 Both presidential candidates would be better
off if neither named names in advance. That would keep their
choosing power at its maximum. But the benefit of one defecting
could be great to that one candidate (winning over swing voters). If
both candidates disclosed, then they would (by hypothesis) be back
to the status quo ante, so neither candidate would have benefited
himself, and both would have reduced their power.
But the assumption of equal effect on voters seems unlikely: in
all probability, the sets of names offered by the candidates will not
have the same effect, and thus one candidate will gain support while
the other will lose it. This could flow in part from the public
perceiving the second discloser as simply copying the first discloser
and trying to play catch-up. Even assuming no first-mover
advantage, it seems likely that one set of names would add more
votes to candidate A than the other set of names would add to
candidate B, because one set of names proves more persuasive to
more key voters.
Thus, this would not be a prisoner’s dilemma but instead another
potential field of competition. What each candidate would gain is a
better shot at the White House in a zero-sum game with his

49. Some will not even need the hint in order to imagine themselves as possible nominees.
50. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Prisoner’s Dilemma, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2007).
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opponent. Offering the names of top appointees would become a
new field of battle. Candidates would be competing to pick slates
that would persuade voters in relevant voting groups.
Presidential candidates already compete with respect to their
choice of running mates. They choose vice presidents who will help
bring particular segments of voters to their side, or at least soften the
perception that a candidate is too extreme (e.g., Reagan choosing
Bush), too moderate (e.g., Dole choosing Kemp), too old (e.g., Kemp
again and McCain choosing Palin), too callow (e.g., Kennedy
choosing Johnson), etc.51 Presidential candidates have a number of
voting groups they want to bring into their coalition, and they know
that no vice-presidential choice will resonate with all these groups.
Announcing Supreme Court and cabinet choices in advance provides
more opportunities for such balancing.
Beyond these narrow electoral considerations, there is a larger
public-policy benefit to announcing nominees in advance: it allows
the president-elect’s key cabinet nominees to begin the transition
process immediately after the November election. As matters stand,
a president-elect names his key officers during the transition after the
election, and the FBI then conducts its background checks (as it does
on all nominees).52 The result is a slow start for each new
administration, as the president waits for his key people to be
approved by the FBI and the Senate before they can dive into their
work. Two members of the 9/11 Commission argue that this current
approach is “ineffective and dangerous” with respect to national
security matters, where a smooth transition is crucial.53 They
contend that the FBI should conduct background checks on top
nominees before the election.54 That way, immediately after the
presidential election the nominees can meet with those they will
succeed and get up to speed on the many issues they will confront.55
This strikes us as right: a slow start-up for a new administration can

51. See Albert, supra note 39, at 874–77 (arguing that a presidential nominee chooses a vice
president who will neutralize perceived weaknesses or shortcomings).
52. The White House, Nominations & Appointments, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
appointments/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
53. See Jamie Gorelick & Slade Gorton, Op-Ed., Between Presidents, a Dangerous Gap,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at A19.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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be costly and dangerous; naming nominees before the election will
help the new administration get a running start.
But, a skeptic might ask, if naming names had the potential of
turning things around for candidates who are significantly behind in
the polls (not to mention smoothing the presidential transition), why
hasn’t a presidential candidate already tried this strategy? The point
is a fair one. Candidates are advised by expert strategists who
presumably have thought through every strategy and weighed costs
and benefits. If the strategy has not been used, it is probably because
it is not a good one.
We have two answers to this objection. First, there have been
relatively near misses and an analogue. In the 2008 election cycle,
Bill Richardson stated, “I would announce my cabinet before the
election. If I’m the nominee, I would tell you who my team would
be.”56 Richardson did not become the nominee, but he believed that
it would be in his interest to reveal his team. And as we noted above,
it has been an open secret in some campaigns that a presidential
candidate would nominate a specific person for a specific job.57
Beyond that, there is at least one instance from the past when a
candidate did something akin to our proposal. In 1976, when Ronald
Reagan was fighting Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination and
needed to persuade the Republican moderates, he took the risky step
of violating convention by naming his vice-presidential running mate
prior to securing the nomination.58 He hoped that naming his vicepresidential candidate (Richard Schweiker) would turn a number of
the delegates in his direction.59 Reagan eventually lost, but the
Schweiker strategy reportedly moved him closer than he would have
been otherwise.60
56. Philip Elliott, Richardson Promises Cabinet Preview, WASH. POST, July 28, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/28/AR2007072
800781.html.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (on Thomas Dewey indicating that he would
nominate John Dulles); McIntyre supra note 10 and accompanying text (George W. Bush
indicating that he would nominate Colin Powell).
58. Matt Negrin, Risky Strategy That Doomed Reagan in ‘76 Could Boost Democrats, B.
GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2008, at A12.
59. See id.
60. A 2008 Boston Globe article reminded readers of the Schweiker strategy, speculating
that Hillary Clinton might want to name a vice-presidential candidate early so as to try to sway
some of the superdelegates who were on the fence. Id. More recently, a candidate for governor
in Maryland in 2006 picked his running mate nine months before the Democratic primary and
won both the primary and the general election. Id. Note though that the Schweiker strategy does
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The above examples are few and far between. Our second
answer is that the benefits for the candidates themselves from such a
strategy, even when they are far behind, probably do not outweigh
the costs. The costs include not being able to promise patronage
appointments after the election. Additionally, the fact that these
appointments were preapproved by the electorate (and may be
instrumental in seeing the president in question elected) would give
the appointees a level of independence that many presidential
candidates would not want to cede. On their own, the candidates
probably have other risks that they are more willing to take when
they are behind in the polls. But the benefits are sufficiently close to
the costs for candidates that we believe the norm can be changed.
This is why our proposal has a chance of working only if there is
some method of pushing the candidates to compete over names—
perhaps by forcing them to tackle the question in a competitive
public debate setting where they are under pressure to score points
over their opponents.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE- AND POSTELECTION NOMINEES
If candidates did give names, how might pre-election nominees
differ from post-election nominees? Are they likely to be more
ideologically extreme? More likely to come from a swing state?
More likely to represent a voting bloc? We begin with the area of
greatest uncertainty (perceived position on the political spectrum)
and then move to areas about which we think we can have some
degree of confidence.
A. Ideology
The effect of pre- versus post-election announcement on
ideology is least certain. Will a presidential candidate choose
nominees who tend to be political moderates (perhaps even members
of the opposite party)? Might a candidate instead lean toward
candidates associated with the most ideological wing of their party?
appear to have angered some conservatives. See NBC Evening News: Campaign 1976,
Republican Convention: Buckley (NBC television broadcast Aug. 11, 1976), available at
http://openweb.tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/1976-8/1976-08-11-NBC-2.html (noting that Reagan
delegate and conservative North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms did not like Schweiker as the vicepresidential choice).
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Relatedly, might a candidate choose a nominee associated with a
powerful interest group, even if that group is unpopular with a
substantial segment of voters? Because there are arguments on both
sides, depending on how a presidential campaign plays out, these
issues are difficult to predict.
The conventional wisdom of presidential campaigns is that
candidates play to the base in the primaries and then move toward
the middle in the general election.61 The candidates want to capture
swing voters in the middle, so they emphasize how moderate they
are. If this dynamic prevails for a given presidential candidate, then
we might expect him to name moderate Supreme Court and cabinet
nominees. He might even want to name one or more moderate
members of the opposite party. Naming a vice president from the
opposing party entails significant risks (since that person would
succeed the president if he died in office) and has been done only
once in United States history, with what is widely regarded as a bad
result (the presidency of Andrew Johnson).62 But there might be
nontrivial benefits to Obama and/or Romney announcing that he will
nominate one or more members of the opposite party as key cabinet
members or as Supreme Court justices.
That said, sometimes presidential campaigns prioritize
energizing their bases. George W. Bush’s 2004 strategy, which
focused on bringing out core supporters, is a prime example.63 If
energizing supporters is a high priority, then we might expect more
ideological nominees.
Then there is the related possibility of appeasing an organized
voter group. Depending on the central issues for such a group,
appealing to its members could push a candidate toward the middle
of the voting populace or toward extremes. If, say, the Concord
Coalition were able to motivate a large number of voters under a
banner of fiscal responsibility, appeasing its members might appeal
to a wide range of moderate voters. That said, the aims of most
organized voter groups tend to be more ideologically skewed. These
61. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Red Meat Season, WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at B01.
62. See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Lieberman Would Be a Bad Veep Choice for McCain, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 27, 2008, at A15.
63. See, e.g., Craig Gilbert, 2008 Presidential Candidates Obama, McCain find lessons in
2004 Campaign, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., June 29, 2008, http://www.jsonline.com/news/president/
29561629.html.
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groups are generally organized to push a particular agenda that they
believe the political mainstream does not adequately represent. The
ideology is part and parcel of their existence and appeal. In keeping
with their origins, their ideology tends to be outside the political
mainstream. Among the more significant of these groups, in terms
of a history of mobilizing issue-based voters, are the National Rifle
Association, trade unions, and conservative religious groups like
Focus on the Family Action. Insofar as the candidates favored by
these groups tend to play to each party’s base (as we think is the
case), naming such a candidate as a cabinet or Supreme Court choice
would push the presidential candidate out of the mainstream, at least
on the issue(s) that the mobilization group cared about. The
presidential candidate’s calculation, presumably, would be that many
more members of the group would change their votes if their favored
candidate were nominated for a post than would non-members of the
group abandon the presidential candidate in disappointment. For
example, it may be that John McCain would have gained more votes
among conservative Christians by naming one or more of their
choices as a Supreme Court nominee than he would have lost among
the rest of the voting populace, if it turned out that many more
conservative Christians vote based on the Supreme Court than other
voters do.64
The problem with predictions about the ideological valence of a
presidential candidate’s choices is that there are many different ways
a campaign can play out. In some campaigns, a candidate may
believe he needs to shore up support among elements of his core
supporters or voter-mobilization groups outside the political center.
In others, he may believe that he needs to appeal to moderates. Does
that mean that we cannot say anything about a presidential
candidate’s likely choices? On the contrary, we can say with some
confidence that naming names before an election will tend to favor
64. Announcing nominees pre-election could give leverage to politically cohesive
minorities—including issue-based groups, as well as racial and ethnic minorities who might want
to use their votes to have narrow concerns addressed. Given that minority groups are typically
not large enough to sway an election through their votes, most minority groups have to throw
their support behind presidential candidates who are promising vague support to a variety of
groups. These candidates, once elected, may not deliver. If, however, the candidates were to
compete on naming potential nominees for posts that these minority groups cared specifically
about, this would be a method by which minority groups could concentrate the effect of their
votes. Pre-election, these groups would be able to compare the names from the two presidential
candidates to see which one would better match their views on the issues of importance to them.
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appointees from swing states and appointees with significant
followings, and will strongly disfavor appointees whose main claim
to fame is that they are confidants of the presidential candidate.
B. Swing States
Because of the Electoral College, presidential elections are a
simultaneous set of state elections. And some states loom large—the
swing states that can collectively determine the outcome of an
election.65 In the 2004 presidential election, the key swing states
were Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.66 Political analysts correctly
predicted that the candidate who won two of those three states would
also win the election.67 The identity of the key swing states could be
different in future elections, but the number of such key states will
still likely be small.68
Candidates know this. The obvious strategy for a candidate is to
appeal to the voters in an important state by naming appointees who
will particularly appeal to voters from that state. A Democrat might
promise to make Ohio’s popular governor, Ted Strickland, his
secretary of the treasury. A Republican might make the same
promise for equally popular Governor Charlie Crist of Florida. Or
maybe a presidential candidate would pick a person from a swing
state with more obvious credentials for the job (say, a sitting state
supreme court justice as a Supreme Court nominee) as a way of
showing a commitment to quality while also choosing a favorite son
or daughter.
There is a cost to this strategy. Voters in other states may feel
slighted because their governor (or whomever they favor) was not
selected. But the point about swing states is that only a relatively
small number of states are likely to be significant, in terms of the
Electoral College. Some voters in Utah might be upset if Romney or
Obama announced a Missourian as the attorney general nominee.
65. See, e.g., Jim Malone, Analysts Say Swing States Hold Key to US Election,
VOANEWS.COM, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-10-24-voa41.cfm.
66. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Bush, Kerry Split in 3 Key Swing States, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2004, at A1.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Political Geography, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/political-geography/ (identifying Montana,
Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, North Carolina, and Florida as swing states for the 2008 presidential
election).
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But any defections in Utah will almost assuredly have no effect on
Utah’s likelihood of voting Republican. Given the benefits of
gaining even half of one percent of the voters in a swing state by
promising a job to a favored politician, such a strategy may make
sense.69
C. Those with a Following Versus Confidants
Similarly predictable are two other phenomena that are related
to each other: presidential candidates tend to choose people who
have some significant political support on their own, and they tend
not to choose people whose sole claim to fame is their relationship
with the candidate.
The point of a campaign is to gain votes, and the safest way to
do that is to select appointees who are popular with voters. That
should lead presidential candidates to choose appointees who are
political figures in their own right with a substantial number of
supporters and a much smaller number of detractors. The goal is to
find appointees who will have the maximum appeal, and that is likely
to mean people with strong and positive reputations.
It is possible that in some situations these considerations will
lead a candidate to name appointees who are regarded for their
ability and judgment but are not widely known among the electorate.
Their following would be created by the positive responses of the
commentariat to their selection. President Ford’s decision to

69. If this happened it would be a return to an earlier model: for most of the history of the
United States, Supreme Court and cabinet choices were understood to reflect regional and statebased balancing. There was a perceived southern seat on the Court, for instance (along with the
more recent “Jewish seat” and the still more recent “woman’s seat”). LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD
SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR
HISTORY 128 (1986) (discussing the New York seat and the New England seat); John Copeland
Nagle, Choosing the Judges Who Choose the President, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 499 (2002)
(“Geographic diversity was crucial throughout the nineteenth century. Certain positions on the
Supreme Court were viewed as the ‘New England seat’ or the ‘Southern seat,’ to be occupied
only by jurists hailing from that part of the nation. Religious diversity has also been important on
occasion, particularly since the implicit establishment of a ‘Jewish seat’ on the Court with
President Wilson's appointment of Justice Brandeis. More recently, racial and gender diversity
has played a significant role in appointments throughout the federal and state judiciary.”);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the
Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659 (1992) (noting “[t]he
establishment of a ‘black's’ and a ‘woman's’ seat on the Supreme Court”). And it was widely
understood that, just as a vice president was chosen for regional balance, so too were cabinet
members. Further, it was often understood that particular powerful states—Ohio, New York, and
Pennsylvania prominent among them—needed to have representation in the cabinet.
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nominate Edward Levi, who was Dean of the Chicago Law School
and President of the University of Chicago before being chosen as
the Attorney General, is one example.70 Ford’s decision was praised
by politicians and commentators who saw Levi as a break from the
perceived cronyism and corruption of the Nixon administration.71
Even though Levi was not a major political figure on his own, he
became a political asset because of the reaction to him. A
presidential candidate might similarly want to dispel any appearance
of cronyism by choosing an appointee who had a sterling
reputation—especially for the Supreme Court, where the public
expects probity and wisdom.
This relates to the proposition about which we have the most
confidence: a candidate usually will not choose appointees who have
neither an existing following nor a sterling reputation, but instead are
largely known as friends or confidants of the candidate. Such a
person brings little value to the electoral equation and brings costs
insofar as she seems to have gained her job through cronyism.
Candidate George W. Bush might have said that he would select
a prominent judge with whom he was friendly for the Supreme Court
(e.g., a member of the Texas Supreme Court), but there is little
chance that, pre-election, he would have named Harriet Miers as a
possible Supreme Court selection. Her stature was perceived to be
purely a function of her relationship with him. In the pre-election
context of a competition for votes, she would have added little. And
the taint of cronyism would have cost him votes.72 The same is true
of Robert Kennedy’s appointment. Just as it is hard to imagine
candidate Bush naming Harriet Miers, it is hard to imagine candidate
John Kennedy naming his brother as his selection for attorney
general.
D. Diversity and Minority Interests
If a candidate decides to announce nominees, he might
sometimes strategically choose more than one name. Return to the
example of Obama seeking to persuade skeptical women voters and
70. See Chris Lehmann, Bedtime for Gonzo: ‘Where’s Ed Levi Now That We Need Him?’,
N.Y. OBSERVER, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.observer.com/2007/bedtime-gonzo.
71. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 141-42 (1992).
72. E.g., David Greenberg, Supreme Court Cronyism: Bush Restarts a Long and Troubled
Tradition, SLATE, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2127493/.
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assuming that their concern rests largely with whether he will
nominate a pro-choice woman to the Court. It might help assuage
the women voters’ concerns more if Obama asserted that not only
was his most favored nominee for the Court a pro-choice woman, but
so were three of his next four favorites. This would provide
additional assurance to skeptical voters that even if the top choice did
not work out, there was still a high likelihood that a woman would be
nominated. The broader point is that naming names could well have
an impact on various forms of diversity, in particular for Court
nominees. If a candidate names three or more potential Supreme
Court nominees, almost assuredly not all three will be white males
(although all three could conceivably be women). A candidate who
names only one nominee, however, might well choose a white male.
V. OBJECTIONS
A. Legality
18 U.S.C. § 599 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly promises
or pledges the appointment, or the use of his influence or
support for the appointment of any person to any public or
private position or employment, for the purpose of
procuring support in his candidacy shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.73
Does this statute prevent a candidate from announcing during the
campaign whom he would nominate for cabinet or Supreme Court
positions?74 No. Depending on methodology, this statute can be
interpreted in different ways. There is a textual ambiguity in the
statute: the trigger for the statute is “procuring support in his
candidacy.”75 Is this trigger procuring support from the public for his
candidacy or instead procuring support from the potential nominee
73. 18 U.S.C. § 599 (2000).
74. Some blogs have answered this question in the affirmative, albeit without any legal
analysis beyond citing the existence of the statute. See Posting of Kevin Drum to
WashingtonMonthly.com,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_01/
010654.php (Jan. 31, 2007, 11:38 EST) (raising the possibility that pre-election announcements
of names might violate federal anti-patronage laws); see also Posting of Michael to Discourse.net,
http://www.discourse.net/archives/2004/03/why_kerry_will_not_appoint_a_shadow_cabinet.html
(Mar. 6, 2004, 10:29 EST).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 599.
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(or perhaps the potential nominee’s associates) for his candidacy?
As a matter of sentence construction, the answer is not clear. The
best argument in favor of § 599’s application to the announcement of
proposed cabinet and Supreme Court members is 18 U.S.C. § 600,
which specifically covers quid pro quo bribery.76 Note, though, that
§ 600 applies to promises regarding “employment, position,
compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for
or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress.”
Hence it may be that both § 599 and § 600 were focused on quid pro
quo corruption, but § 600 is more focused on those involving acts of
Congress. Beyond these textual considerations, the legislative
history of 18 U.S.C. § 599 reveals that Congress targeted corruption
in the form of candidates secretly auctioning government
appointments in return for money and political patronage from
corrupt interests.77 The fear was that a candidate would go “to the
corrupt interests and tell them that he will be their agent and tool.”78
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress had the
remotest concerns about the sort of statements we are proposing,

76. 18 U.S.C. § 600 provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, compensation,
contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in
part by any Act of Congress, or any special consideration in obtaining any such benefit,
to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the
support of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in connection with any
general or special election to any political office, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political
office, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
77. 66 CONG. REC. 2603 (1925).
78. Id. (statement of Sen. Heflin). The statute was originally passed as the Federal Corrupt
Practice Act of 1925. In addition to the statement by Senator Heflin, its sponsor, Senator David
Walsh, explained the purpose of the bill: since money had become increasingly influential in
campaigns, candidates must “put themselves under the domination and influence and control and
direction of those who have wealth” if they want to win. Id. (statement of Sen. Walsh). The
1925 statute applied only to Senate and House candidates. Federal Corrupt Practice Act of 1925,
43 Stat. 1073; CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM; A SOURCEBOOK 29 (Anthony Corrado ed., 1997).
The statute was codified and moved to Title 18 in 1948, but “the original intent of Congress is
preserved.” 94 CONG. REC. 8721 (1948) (quoting Sen. Wiley). After passing the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, Congress included presidential and vice-presidential candidates
under the relevant sections of Title 18. But it did so with its eye on the corrupting power of
money, the original intent of the statute. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearing
on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the S. Comm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong. 368 (1971) (statement of Joseph Califano) (“Isn’t the relationship between
campaign contributions and ambassadorial posts a luxury beyond our national means in the crisisprone world of the 1970’s? Are not domestic issues sufficiently complex to require high level
executive branch appointments on the basis of ability without regard to financial contributions?”).
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which would be neither based on money nor secret. It is hard to see
how such announcements could be regarded as the sort of corruption
at which Congress was aiming.
We do not dwell on these arguments regarding statutory
interpretation because any attempt at applying this statute to a
candidate’s promises would violate the First Amendment. In Brown
v. Hartlage,79 the United States Supreme Court confronted a state
statute very similar to § 599.80 A candidate for county commissioner
had promised to lower commissioners’ salaries if elected, and the
Kentucky Court of Appeals found that this violated the following
state statute:
[W]hen a candidate offers to discharge the duties of an
elective office for less than the salary fixed by law, a salary
which must be paid by taxation, he offers to reduce pro
tanto the amount of taxes each individual taxpayer must
pay, and thus makes an offer to the voter of pecuniary
gain.81
The Supreme Court reversed, unanimously. The Court treated this
regulation of candidates’ speech as subject to strict scrutiny (one in a
long line of cases so finding),82 and it invalidated this statute because
it failed the first prong of a strict scrutiny inquiry: the identification
79. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
80. The statute at issue in Hartlage provided that:
No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or district office shall
expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other
thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote or
financial or moral support of that person. No such candidate shall promise, agree or
make a contract with any person to vote for or support any particular individual, thing
or measure, in consideration for the vote or the financial or moral support of that
person in any election, primary or nominating convention, and no person shall require
that any candidate make such a promise, agreement or contract.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (West 1982).
81. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 51 n.6 (quoting Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. Ct. App.
1960) (internal citation omitted)).
82. See Buckley v. Valeo, 452 U.S. 946 (1976); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218–19 (1966).
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of
candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
Id.
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of a compelling state interest. The Court noted that there was a
plausible claim that a promise to accept a lower salary would reduce
voters’ taxes, but it found that the state’s interest in preventing votebuying was not implicated because “Brown did not offer some
private payment or donation in exchange for voter support; Brown’s
statement can only be construed as an expression of his intention to
exercise public power in a manner that he believed might be
acceptable to some class of citizens.”83 As the Court emphatically
stated:
Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of
government officials to the people whom they represent,
and assist the voters in predicting the effect of their vote.
The fact that some voters may find their self-interest
reflected in a candidate’s commitment does not place that
commitment beyond the reach of the First Amendment. We
have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without
taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political
pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters
will pursue their individual good through the political
process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits
will further the collective welfare. So long as the hoped-for
personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal
processes of government, and not through some private
arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable
basis upon which to cast one’s ballot.84
In Hartlage, there was at least a plausible interest that the state
could articulate (avoiding vote-buying), even though it was
unpersuasive.85 It is difficult to see any legitimate—much less
compelling—interest that the government would have in preventing
83. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 58.
84. Id. at 55–56; see also id. at 60
In barring certain public statements with respect to this issue, the State ban runs
directly contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as the
guardian of our democracy. That Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange
of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad,
and between candidates for political office. The State’s fear that voters might make an
ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting
speech.
Id.
85. Id. at 54.
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corruption via prohibiting the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court
nominees. Put differently, it is hard to fathom what the state’s
interest would be. In Hartlage, there was a benefit to voters in the
form of reduced taxes,86 but here there is no benefit to voters other
than the likely nomination of appointees whom they would like to
see in positions of power—and there is no conceivable state interest
in preventing that from happening.
The government might have an interest in prohibiting concealed
promises from candidates to potential nominees. Secret promises
give no information to voters, so their only benefit is a private one to
the candidate and/or to the nominee. That underscores the
implausibility of any government interest in preventing the public
naming of nominees in advance. There is no corrupting element.
A different way to come at this question is to consider why the
First Amendment is treated as placing a high value on electioneering
speech. One reason is because an active and full debate among
candidates helps voters make more informed choices.87 The voters
are the customers choosing among products in the marketplace of
ideas. Reading the statute to prohibit the public disclosure of
prospective nominees results in the implicit (and sometimes explicit)
bargains between presidential candidates and prospective nominees
being pushed underground. And that in turn prevents voters from
being able to evaluate the competing bargains that the different
candidates have struck—the opposite of what First Amendment
values push toward. In effect, this occurred with Earl Warren’s
appointment to the Supreme Court in 1953. Dwight Eisenhower
reportedly promised Earl Warren that he would be appointed to the
Court as soon as a seat opened up.88 The public, though, had no way
of factoring this promise into their decision as to whether to vote for
Eisenhower.
It is simply impossible to imagine any compelling interest for
the application of § 599 to our proposal, much less a compelling
interest to which application of § 599 would be narrowly tailored.
And it bears noting that in the years since Hartlage, the Court has, if
anything, raised the First Amendment bar for regulations on

86. Id. at 48.
87. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1048 (2d ed. 2005).
88. See Dorsen, supra note 18, at 657.
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campaign speech. For example, the Court has held that a prohibition
on candidates for judicial office “‘announc[ing] his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues’” violates the First Amendment,
despite the obvious state interest in avoiding the appearance of
impartiality.89 The bottom line, then, is that application of § 599 to
our proposal would run afoul of the First Amendment, and the matter
seems so clear that the weight of expert opinion would so conclude.
The clarity of this unconstitutionality is important. We could
imagine a candidate’s staff concluding that a seeming prohibition on
some planned activity would not apply, but also that reasonable
minds could differ as to legality, so that the candidate should not
engage in that activity. Section 599 is not one of those cases,
because there is no plausible argument that its application to a
presidential candidate is consistent with First Amendment
jurisprudence. Just as the vast majority of economists said that a
summer “gas tax holiday” would be a bad idea,90 so too the vast
majority of legal scholars would conclude that application of § 599
to the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court members would be
unconstitutional.
It bears noting that the revelation of the
economists’ views on the gas tax holiday coincided with a shift in
polls on the issue; early support by a majority of those polled gave
way to majority opposition once the economists’ views became
known.91
Perhaps that clarity explains why § 599 has never been the
subject of a single case and why it has come up so rarely: those who
might raise the issue know that they are subject to the objections that
not only are they being legalistic and litigious but also their legal
arguments fail on their own terms because the statute is so obviously
unconstitutional. In the public’s eye, one of the few things worse
than a narrow, legalistic claim is a narrow, legalistic claim that,
according to experts, is flatly wrong because it is unconstitutional.

89. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
90. See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, The 18-Cent Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A37.
91. See, e.g., Posting of Brad Aaron, Q Poll Finds Americans Opposed to Gas Tax
“Holiday”, to Streetsblog (May 15, 2008), http://www.streetsblog.org/2008/05/15/q-poll-findsamericans-opposed-to-gas-tax-holiday; Matthew Yglesias, Shocking Results, THEATLANTIC.COM,
May 5, 2008, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/shocking_results.php.
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B. Too Much Like an Election
In effect, we are pushing toward more direct democracy. The
large literature on the evils of judicial elections suggests that moving
toward something akin to the election of justices on the Court is
crazy.92 But if unpacked, the objection to the election of judges is
not that elections are bad. Instead, the objection is primarily to
uninformed voters.93 The argument is that the electorate has little
incentive to obtain the information necessary to make good choices,
so the result is more farce than anything resembling an election. The
typical critique of elections involves invoking some story of an
election in which some unqualified candidate won simply because he
had a catchy name or that his name resembled that of someone
famous.94
But even conceding that voters are not adequately informed
when it comes to local and state elections, they will likely have more
information regarding a Supreme Court justice or a top cabinet
position. If anything, because the candidates are competing for
voters, the supporters of the different potential nominees will
compete to provide more information about their favorite nominees,
in the hope that the candidates will choose them. Lack of
information about the nominees is unlikely to be the problem.95

92. E.g., Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court’s Thoughts? The High Price of Judicial
Elections, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 29 (2008).
93. E.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different Means:
American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 423 (2007).
94. Id.
95. A different concern is that voters will be interested only in one issue, such as abortion
and (for a Supreme Court justice) thus whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), will be
overturned. Given the voting public’s focus on a limited set of oversimplified issues, one might
fear that the naming of a potential nominee to the Court would simply result in voters asking
whether this nominee would vote in favor of upholding Roe or not. We do not see why it would
be a terrible thing if voters had better information as to whether a presidential candidate would
appoint justices who would overturn or affirm Roe. As a general principle, we should prefer
voting that is better informed. The fear, though, is that better informed voting about a single issue
will do more harm than good. But persuadable voters will care about a range of issues that they
believe the Supreme Court may decide—Roe, Ten Commandments displays, the Second
Amendment, etc.—not just one single issue. The hot-button issues that interest voters do not, of
course, encompass the range of cases that the Supreme Court decides. But that is already the
case: with respect to Supreme Court nominees, not only the public but also interest groups and
Senators focus on a few hot-button issues. And the advantage of our proposal is that voters get
much more information about presidential candidates and their administration’s policies before
they cast their votes.
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A related objection is that cabinet members or Court appointees
whose names were announced pre-election might see themselves as
having received a mandate from the voters, independent of the
president. They may, in other words, have their own agendas. An
example here is another recent historical analogue—George W.
Bush’s broad hints that he would name Colin Powell as his secretary
of state.96 This pre-election anointing might have led Powell to see
himself as having an independent connection to the voters and thus
led him to resist the Bush administration’s agenda.
One
commentator put this forward as a reason why pre-election
announcements are unwise, suggesting that such announcements will
lead to greater independence on the part of cabinet members.97 Of
course, whether this is desirable or not is hotly contested. This
implicates one of the central questions regarding the structure of the
federal government: how much control should a president have over
those who serve in his administration? There are no easy answers to
this question, as an increase in presidential control will strike some
as beneficial and others as harmful. But, in any event, the president
would still have the same legal authority—including the ability to
fire those in his cabinet.
The Supreme Court bears particular emphasis on this question of
independence. Most people would embrace independence in a
Supreme Court justice with good reason: if justices simply mirror the
views of the president who appoints them, then they are acting as a
small, unrepresentative group of life-tenured super-legislators—and
it is far from clear why we should embrace that state of affairs.98
The larger point is that the competition for votes is what matters.
If presidential candidates think that voters prefer to elect a president
with advisers and Court appointees who are beholden to him, then let
us force them to take that position. And maybe we will have a

96. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 10.
97. See Posting of Jacob T. Levy to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive_2004_07_14.shtml#1089997773 (Jul. 16, 2004, 13:09 EST).
98. Books can be—and have been—written on this subject, and we will not dwell on it here.
But the overwhelming weight of the commentary is that it would be undesirable to have a Court
whose members simply voted as the president who appointed them would. Empirical research
suggests that the alignment of Supreme Court justices and the views of the presidents appointing
them have been increasing over time. See Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of
Ideology in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L .REV. 609
(2008).
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competition where the presidential candidates adopt different
strategies. One would disclose his prospective cabinet and Court
nominees, and the other would not. The voters would be better
informed as to what type of president they were voting for.99
C. Too Much Pressure and Scrutiny on the Nominees
A third objection involves the scrutiny of the nominees.
Arguably, there is a greater incentive for political opponents to find
damaging information about a nominee before the election, for the
simple reason that such information could help to change the
outcome of the election. Torpedoing an elected president’s nominee
has some benefits for the opposition (tarnishing the president,
perhaps getting a replacement nominee more to the opposition’s
liking), but the president still gets to choose the failed nominee’s
replacement. Damaging a nominee pre-election, however, might
have a greater payoff, because it might sufficiently hurt the candidate
(likely distracting the candidate from his message, and perhaps
making him seem like a poor judge of character) to cause him to lose
the election. After all, we are positing that the naming of a nominee
could swing the election in a candidate’s favor. If that is so, then
maybe the tarnishing of the nominee could swing the election back
toward the candidate’s opponent. And in light of the incentives to
find dirt on the pre-election nominees, wouldn’t the scrutiny be too
severe? Maybe it would be so severe that it would dissuade the best
nominees. And surely, it would be uncomfortable for a sitting
judge—on a state or lower federal court—to be the topic of debate
during a presidential election.
99. What about the danger that having to name names in advance might unduly constrain the
president’s ability to adjust to changed circumstances? After all, in the period between the
presidential election and when a seat on the Supreme Court opens up, circumstances can change.
Those changed circumstances can, in turn, alter presidential preferences regarding appointments
to the Court. The point is a fair one. Having named names in advance, the president would not
be able to alter names as easily as he would have been able to do otherwise. But that is not
necessarily a bad thing. If changed circumstances required a deviation from the previously
named names, the president would have to explain, with specific reasons, why the new name was
better in the context of those changed circumstances. For example, say that it is three years since
the presidential election before a seat opens up on the Court. In that period, a new star has
emerged in the ranks of the state court judiciary—one who is considered fair minded and
insightful and whose opinions are the most cited of any state court judge in the country. For the
president to name this person over the previously named individual, he would have to provide a
credible and detailed explanation for why the new nominee was better than the prior one. Vague
statements about how “this is the most qualified individual” would not suffice. The end result
would be greater transparency.

Winter 2009]

MR. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

325

The potential benefits of attacking an opponent’s nominees are
greater pre-election than post-election. But so are the potential costs.
If, say, Romney announced nominees who were subjected to attacks
that the public perceived as unfair, the public would likely attribute
the unfairness to Obama. Obama probably would not persuade many
people if he tried to say that the attacks were independent of him;
people would likely believe that his people were involved in it, just
as voters believed that George H.W. Bush was involved in the Willie
Horton advertisement in 1988.100 Indeed, if Obama tried to distance
himself from attacks on Romney’s nominees, voters might see that as
him trying to weasel out of responsibility. In other words, in the
crucible of an election, when the battle between two opposing
ideologies is personified in a race between two individuals, the
benefits and costs of everything relating to the campaign are received
and borne by those two individuals.
It still may be that campaigns decide that a particular attack will
win over more persuadable voters than it will deter. Increasing your
vote count and/or decreasing your opponent’s are the only cost and
benefit that matter to a campaign. One can imagine many different
attacks, and some percentage of them will win more votes than they
will lose. But it is difficult even for political professionals to figure
out in advance which attacks will work and which will not, and
sometimes they explode in the face of those peddling the
information. In 2004, presidential candidate John Kerry pointedly
noted that Dick Cheney’s daughter is a lesbian,101 hoping to score
political points. But the reaction to his statement was so negative
that it likely was counterproductive for Kerry.102
Indeed, the scrutiny for those named before the election could be
lower—and perhaps better, from the candidate’s and the populace’s
perspective—than it would be after the election. There are a couple
of reasons why this might be the case. First, during an election,
given that there are numerous other issues to be debated, the scrutiny
may be lower. Further, the larger the number of names announced,
100. See, e.g., Jake Tapper, The Willie Horton Alumni Assocation, SALON, Aug. 25, 2000,
http://archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/08/25/horton/index.html.
101. Tom Vanden Brook, Kerry Lesbian Remark Angers Cheneys, USA TODAY, Oct. 14,
2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-10-14-lynnecheney_x.htm.
102. Sharon Kehnemui Liss, Kerry Clarifies ‘Lesbian’ Remark, FOX NEWS, Oct. 16, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,135392,00.html.
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the lower the attention paid to any one of those names is likely to be.
Second, think about the type of scrutiny that might be applied before
an election versus after. After the election, the president has control
of the choice. Scrutiny therefore tends to be largely of the
muckraking variety—looking to see whether the nominee rented
dirty videos or joined some inappropriate student group while in
college. That makes sense, since the only game being played is
unearthing enough dirt to tank the nominee. If the game is moved to
the pre-election period, however, the scrutiny might be in terms of
which presidential candidate has the better proposed nominees. In
other words, it might be scrutiny of the useful and positive variety.
Some of the proposed nominees might still come out looking worse
for the wear. But those potential nominees, if given the choice, may
prefer scrutiny before the election over scrutiny after.103
A particular incentive for potential nominees is that there may
be a kind of estoppel effect. A potential nominee whose name was
put forward before the election and whose candidate won could make
two related arguments. First, my candidate won the election after
releasing my name, so the voters effectively ratified my selection.
Second, you had a chance to make your objections before the
election, and you failed to do so persuasively, so now it is unfair for
you to bring forward new arguments or even to oppose me.
One might still imagine that potential nominees will not want to
be named in advance, because they will know that the scrutiny may
be for naught. After all, the most obvious difference between preand post-election nomination is that the scrutiny after the election is
only for the nominee whose candidate is elected, whereas the
scrutiny before the election is for two sets of nominees (one for each
major party presidential candidate, assuming that both decide to
name their nominees). So one set of names will be subject to public
scrutiny and then still not be selected for the positions, because their
candidate lost the election. In addition, if a presidential candidate
names three possible choices for each given cabinet position, then
103. Relatedly, since expected scrutiny and expected penalty go hand in hand in making
strategic choices during an election, it may be that the penalty for naming a person who turns out
to have a sordid past might not be as large in the pre-election context. Perhaps, in the pre-election
context, because the public will know that the candidate had less time to evaluate the potential
nominees, the penalty will be lower. We concede, however, that it may be that the first time or
two a presidential candidate names names, the public will expect lots of vetting (because of the
boldness of trying something new).
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not only would the losing candidate’s choices be subject to scrutiny
without obtaining the cabinet position, but so would two-thirds of the
winning candidate’s named choices. This last point is a reason why
a presidential candidate might choose to name a single person for
each cabinet position. The biggest payoff for undecided and
skeptical voters arises if they know that their favored candidate will
be secretary of X, rather than knowing that their favored candidate is
one of three possibilities.
But let us return to the nominees of the presidential candidate
who loses. What difference will this make? It will disappoint those
who are named by presidential candidates who lose the election. But
will it make enough of a difference to persuade anyone to remove her
name from consideration by a presidential candidate? We doubt that
it would, for a few reasons. First, there is distinction in being chosen
by a candidate. Everyone would prefer to be secretary of the
treasury rather than simply to be proffered as the secretary if one’s
presidential candidate wins. The question is which of the following
would be a person’s second choice: (1) to be named as a presidential
candidate’s choice for secretary of X but have one’s candidate lose;
(2) never to have been named, believing (along with at least several
others) that one would have been chosen by the presidential nominee
had he been elected but never finding out because that candidate lost.
Most would choose the first option, because with the first option the
potential candidate has been identified as such and thus received a
fair amount of fame and press attention. There is an analogy to the
position of running mate. Vice-presidential candidate Bob Dole
would have preferred that he and President Ford had been elected in
1976. But merely being on the ticket helped his political fortunes,
pushing him to a greater level of prominence than he would have
achieved if he had not been chosen as Ford’s vice-presidential
running mate.104 The same is true for Sarah Palin, Joe Lieberman,
Jack Kemp, Geraldine Ferraro, and most every other losing vicepresidential candidate.105

104. See Martin Tolchin & Jeff Gerth, The Contradictions of Bob Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1987, § 6, 63 (describing Dole’s televised debate with Walter F. Mondale as the most memorable
moment of 1976 vice presidential race).
105. Some suggest that simply being on Bob Dole’s short list in 1996 (Dole eventually chose
Jack Kemp) propelled McCain’s career. See Mark Leibovich, The Great American Float, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2008, at 1 (Week in Review), 5..
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That said, neither the presidential candidate nor his announced
choices will be happy if the candidate puts forward a name with
skeletons in the closet. Many aspects of one’s personal life (e.g.,
having sex with prostitutes or soliciting sex in men’s bathrooms) are
considered fair game, and presidential candidates are going to avoid
people about whom there might be embarrassing revelations. This
will lead to a preference for pre-election nominees who can credibly
claim to be squeaky clean.
One way to credibly establish such a claim is for the potential
nominee or the campaign to hire an independent investigative firm to
check her background. But the more obvious solution is for the FBI
to perform background checks. The FBI already performs such
checks for all nominees,106 so this would just move up the time for a
few of those checks.107 As noted above, pre-election FBI background
checks would have the added advantage of having the new
president’s team up and running as soon as possible after the
election.108
Beyond that, a potential nominee could credibly claim to be
squeaky clean based on a different sort of background check—the
scrutiny that comes from running for office or holding other
important political positions. Someone who has recently run for
office can point out that political opponents and the press extensively
researched her background and found nothing. So, insofar as private
or FBI vetting is unattractive, pre-election selection will tend to favor
existing politicians. And, again, pre-election selection will favor
existing politicians for another reason: presidential candidates will
want to name people with a significant following (in the hope that
they are sufficiently popular to bring some persuadable voters to vote
for the presidential candidate), and people with such a following will

106. See Gorelick & Gorton, supra note 47.
107. Presidential candidates would not need to worry about a hostile administration getting
information from the FBI. Such a leak would be a remarkable breach of protocol. If information
about an FBI background check were released to the public in advance of an announcement, the
presidential candidate would (fairly) express his outrage at the administration’s violation of the
FBI’s processes. And the charge would likely be effective: people do not like the idea of the FBI
playing politics. The hostile administration could try to remove its fingerprints from the leak.
But, as with the release of unfair attacks, people will attribute the attacks to the party that
benefits, and will associate that party (naturally enough) with the party’s presidential candidate.
108. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
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tend to be existing politicians who, not coincidentally, have already
been subject to much scrutiny.
One issue lingers: with respect to Supreme Court nominees,
sitting judges may feel some discomfort. Maybe these judges would
find it difficult to make decisions fairly while under such scrutiny.
We are skeptical, however. At the outset, we note that it might not
be so horrible if presidents choose Supreme Court justices from
outside the pool of sitting judges. Sitting lower court judges do bring
with them the experience of having been judges, but the Supreme
Court is a different entity than the lower courts. As noted above,
some commentators believe that we would be better served by
justices who are drawn from beyond the judiciary.109 There would be
costs to not being able to draw from the pool of lower court judges,
but possible benefits too.
The more important point is that if lower court judges did feel
discomfort—as they probably should in politically sensitive cases in
the period of time after their names have been announced by a
presidential candidate—they could recuse themselves from those
politically hot cases. Given that there is already a perceived problem
with some lower court judges auditioning for the Supreme Court
through their opinions, it might be good to eliminate that auditioning
by naming names and inducing recusals.
Under the current norm, some appellate court judges may shape
their opinions with an eye toward a presidential candidate’s advisers
who may be scrutinizing those opinions for the right kinds of
attitudes. Naming names in advance should ameliorate that problem.
It will reduce the number of judges auditioning and will also allow
(if not force) the chosen ones to recuse themselves from some cases,
or to take a leave of absence, to avoid the appearance of political
favoritism. That transparency seems preferable to the opacity of a
bunch of judges trying to outdo each other in currying favor with a
new president.
D. Too Much Distraction from the Key Issues
About the Candidates Themselves
Would forcing candidates to think hard about whom specifically
they might want on the Supreme Court (or as their secretary of
109. See supra text accompanying notes 23–24.
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defense or treasury) before the election force them to turn their
attention away from important campaign or policy questions? The
answer depends on what a discussion of nominees would displace.
One only has to look at the sorts of issues that the media choose to
focus on—and therefore that the candidates have to focus on—in
campaigns. Some give us useful information about a president’s
likely performance and policies (e.g., who has the better health-care
plan),110 but such discussions are often overwhelmed by endless
rehashing of supposed gaffes or other ephemera.111 A presidential
candidate’s naming of possible cabinet or Supreme Court appointees
would produce at least some discussion about whether the named
people would be good choices and what this reveals about the likely
policies of the president’s administration, which with any luck would
be more illuminating about the president’s likely policies and
performance in office than whatever it would crowd out. Given the
financial crisis that arose in 2008, wouldn’t it have been worthwhile
for the candidates to compete on who would appoint a better
secretary of treasury? Or, given the situation in Iraq, maybe the
country would have benefited from a competition in the 2008
election over who the secretaries of defense and state would be.
Our proposal does push the electoral considerations slightly
toward a focus on a presidential candidate’s team. But, given the
importance of cabinet members and Supreme Court justices, such a
move seems appropriate. And, significantly, the media and voters
already pay a lot of attention to people who are perceived as
reflecting on the presidential candidate’s judgment—in this past
election cycle preachers have loomed large,112 and to a lesser extent

110. See, e.g., Margaret Talev & William Douglas, Obama and McCain Bring Health-Care
Fight to Red States, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/
3046/story/575813.html.
111. See, e.g., Paul Hitlin et al., Gaffes Drove the Campaign Narrative Last Week,
JOURNALISM.ORG, http://journalism.org/node/11881 (providing an overview of the 2008
Presidential Campaign for the week of July 7–13, noting a high level of coverage on gaffes and
anticipating that coverage will continue to be dominated by such gaffes).
112. E.g., Charles Krauthhammer, A Question of Barack Obama’s Character,
REALCLEARPOLITICS, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/10/obamas_
character_still_questio.html (discussing Obama’s ties with Reverend Jeremiah Wright); Brian
Todd et al., McCain Rejects Minster’s Endorsement, CNN.COM http://www.cnn.com/2008/
POLITICS/05/22/mccain.hagee/index.html (noting the controversy over John Hagee’s and Rod
Parsley’s endorsements of John McCain, and McCain’s decision to reject both endorsements).
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the tactics and lobbying ties of top campaign officials.113 This
highlights that voters are often interested in the people around a
president. Even casual sports fans usually know something about
more than one player on a given team, so it is not surprising that
voters have some interest in a presidential candidate’s team.114 As
long as the media and voters are going to be interested in people who
seem to reflect on a candidate, it will be in a candidate’s—and
society’s—interest for at least some of that focus to shift toward the
people who will be making important decisions. Cabinet officials
and Supreme Court justices will be at the top of that list.115
We recognize the argument that the presidential race should be
about the candidate’s character, his family values, his spouse’s
family values, and so on. Our proposal would distract from that—for
which we make no apologies.
E. Reducing the Incentives to Work on the
Candidates’ Campaigns
The claim underlying this argument is that many of those who
work on presidential campaigns or contribute money do so in the
hope of being rewarded with positions in the administration. The
competition among these campaigners is most intense for the most
prestigious positions, such as judgeships, cabinet positions, and
ambassadorships. Sometimes, the person doing the campaigning is
113. E.g., Ken Dilenian, Obama’s Claim of Independence Questioned, USATODAY.COM,
Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-04-15-obamainside_
N.htm (discussing Obama’s ties to law firms, state lobbyists, and corporate executives);
Menachem Rosensaft, Meet John McCain’s Pals, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/menachem-rosensaft/meet-john-mccains-pals_b_136085.html
(discussing McCain’s ties with Phil Gramm and Charles Black).
114. As a comparative matter, the average voter will likely know far more about the starting
players on their favorite team than they will know about any of the people on a candidate’s team
(and maybe the candidate himself), but as an absolute matter many voters will still have interest
in a presidential candidate’s team.
115. What if McCain had said that the economy was in shambles and that he was going to ask
Robert Rubin and Larry Summers to come back to run things on the financial front? Maybe
Obama would have countered with someone better. Or maybe he would have said that he also
would ask Rubin and Summers. That way—assuming the electorate agreed that the RubinSummers combination would be optimal—we might have had effective financial policy
regardless of who was elected. One can spin out a similar story for the Supreme Court. If the
candidates were to compete and there was a clearly optimal nonpartisan solution that the populace
preferred—maybe a modern version of Learned Hand or Henry Friendly (neither of whom ever
got on to the High Court)—we might even get a situation where the candidates would end up
being forced to agree on the same candidate. The candidates would not like this because it would
reduce their ability to pay back political favors. But the electorate would be better off.
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not seeking the appointment for herself but wants input on whom the
president selects. The incentive effects on behavior are the same,
though. There is a tournament of sorts among supporters, rewarding
those who do the most with appointments or the power to influence
appointments. If candidates are forced to name names in the preelection context, this will reduce the incentives for supporters to
work hard since they will now know who will be receiving positions
and who will not.
We have no quarrel with the foregoing; it strikes us as an
accurate portrayal of incentives. Yes, there will be fewer incentives
to work hard on a campaign for those who are hoping to leverage
their work into an appointment. And that will make it more difficult
for the candidates to run their campaigns. Maybe candidates will end
up having to work harder on fundraising. But is there a net social
loss? Reducing the candidates’ ability to use the prospect of future
appointments as a carrot to induce effort from campaign staff
increases social value in that having fewer patronage-based
appointments should result in better-quality appointments overall.116
VI. CONCLUSION: WORTH MOVING
BEYOND THE STATUS QUO?
In light of the above, and dozens of other objections that we
have not anticipated, would it be a good idea for the rules of the
presidential election game to be changed—to push candidates to give
specific answers about who their nominees for cabinet and Court
positions will be? There are potential downsides. The candidates
might refuse to answer the questions. Or there might be large-scale
capture by interest groups. We believe, however, that the odds are in
our favor that inducing greater competition over the names of
prospective nominees will yield improvement over the status quo.
The gains would flow from forcing information out of the
candidates. Voters would have more information in two ways. First,
116. A related objection is that the election process, where various contenders for
appointments compete to show the presidential candidate which of them is more loyal and
capable (e.g., by demonstrating good or bad judgment in what they say to the press), supplies
useful information to presidential candidates. But characteristics like loyalty and judgment will
likely have been demonstrated for months (if not years) before, and any additional seeming
increment of those characteristics shown during the campaign may not reveal accurate
information. Anyone can put on a good show for a couple of months, if the incentive is a top spot
in a new administration.
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the public would know who key members of an administration would
be. The public could evaluate the president’s choices, rather than
guess about them based on reports of whom the president seemed to
favor or who worked tirelessly on his campaign. Second, the identity
of those nominees would provide information about the other people
that the president might appoint, and more generally about the sorts
of policies that the president might pursue. Naming names is a
costly signal—and costly signals yield more information than does
cheap talk. This information will be particularly valuable for
presidential candidates whose prior public careers have been fairly
short, which describes a good percentage of recent presidents.117
More broadly, the choices made would give us important information
about the potential president. Is he willing to take risks by
nominating potentially controversial candidates? Does he choose
people with lots of government experience or outsiders? Does he
seem more comfortable with people of a certain temperament?
And while we have nothing against discussions of the trivial—
we like political gossip as much as the next person—naming names
would allow for more substantive and informative news stories about
the candidate’s people, and with any luck would reduce the space
devoted to pure fluff. In each of the last two presidential races the
New York Times saw fit to devote front-page space to an article about
the person who carries the Democratic nominee’s snacks.118 These
gentlemen seem like nice people,119 but does the public gain insight
into the likely policies of a President Kerry by learning that he likes
peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, or the policies of a President
Obama by finding out that he likes Met-Rx protein bars? More
useful would be profiles of the people that a candidate was actually
going to choose for policy positions. Such profiles are not terribly
useful when many names are bandied about; these discussions have

117. Eisenhower had no previous experience as an elected official; Kennedy had a fairly short
legislative career prior to his presidency; Carter had a single term as Governor of Georgia;
George W. Bush had a term and a half as Governor of Texas.
118. See Ashley Parker, On the Court and on the Trail, One Aide Looms Over Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2008, at A1 (profiling Reggie Love, Barack Obama’s “body man,” who says that
his job is to “Take. Care. Of. Stuff,” for example procuring Met-Rx protein bars for Obama); Jodi
Wilgoren, Part Butler and Part Buddy, Aide Keeps Kerry Running, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2004,
at A1 (profiling Marvin Nicholson, John Kerry’s “body man” who is identified as the “chief of
stuff”—for example procuring peanut butter and jelly sandwiches for Kerry).
119. One of the authors has met both and can attest that they seem quite likable.
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at most a snippet about each of the people who might be a prominent
cabinet member or a Supreme Court justice. And the discussions
often spend a fair amount of time speculating about whose star is
ascending and whose is falling. Such guesswork can make for a
parlor game, but its value is limited. By contrast, if we had actual
names, then we could learn more about them and as a result learn
about the policies that the administration would likely pursue.
Ultimately, the desirability of a competition over names is in the
eye of the beholder. But note a broader dispositional factor that
looms large: one’s attitude toward change. For those wary of
change, our proposal will be anathema. For those sympathetic to it,
it may be welcome. It likely comes down to your sympathy for
Edmund Burke versus your sympathy for a quotation made famous
by Ronald Reagan: “Status quo, you know, that is Latin for the mess
we’re in.”120

120. See President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Reception for Members of the Associated
General Contractors of America (Mar. 16, 1981), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1981/31681c.htm.

